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The growth in size and significance of NGOs and particularly of Grameen Bank and 
the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) in Bangladesh challenges the ideal-
typical relationship between the state, donors and NGOs. Such an ideal envisions a clear 
demarcation of roles in which NGOs compete with other NGOs for resources from the state 
and/or donors and one in which NGO activities and programmes are regulated or held 
accountable by their respective funding sources. The emergence of large multitasking NGOs 
in a relatively small and weak state such as Bangladesh belies this ideal. Grameen and 
BRAC compete with government ministries for donor funding; statal institutions designed to 
regulate the activities of such NGOs are functionally ineffective; and international donors 
face insuperable hurdles in assessing accountability.  
 
In 1993, Lester Salamon wrote that the growth and development of Non-
Governmental Organisations since the 1980s constituted “a veritable associational 
revolution... which may constitute as significant a social and political development of 
the latter Twentieth Century as the rise of the nation-state was of the Nineteenth 
Century.”
1 Even if one considers this assertion a bit extreme, there is no gainsaying the 
fact that the sudden proliferation of the number and importance of NGOs during the 
past twenty years or so is an extremely important phenomenon; and this phenomenon is 
global in scope. Conservatively speaking the number of NGOs has more than doubled 
during the past decade in the Northern states and has increased by more than a factor of 
four in the Southern states. The scale of operations of such organisations and their 
attendant resource bases have risen proportionally as well.  
This phenomenon seems particularly important in South Asia.  First, the number 
of NGOs has grown at a very rapid rate.  In Nepal 220 NGOs were officially registered 
in 1990, by 1993 that number had grown to 1,210; in Pakistan less than 300 NGOs 
were registered in 1990, over 2,000 are now registered and some observers have 
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1As quoted in Michael Edwards and David Hulme (eds)  Beyond the Magic Bullet:  NGO 
Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World. Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1996, p. 
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estimated that there are over 15,000 total NGOs in operation in the state; in Bangladesh 
the Association for Development Action in Bangladesh (ADAB) had 669 registered 
members in 1992; this number had grown to nearly 1400 by 1999.  Similar rapid 
growth could be documented for both India and Sri Lanka as well.  
Related to this increase in overall numbers has been the extraordinary growth of 
several large “multitasking” NGOs which provide health, education, and credit services 
to millions of people in thousands of communities.  The growth of such “big NGOs” or 
“BINGOs”
2 as they are sometimes called is most pronounced in Bangladesh where at 
least three BINGOs—Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), Grameen 
Bank, and Proshika—have full-time staffs of greater than 5,000 people, and each serves 
more than two million clients.  But, India also has its share of BINGOs (e.g. Working 
Women’s Forum; Self-Employed Women’s Association) as does Sri Lanka (e.g. 
Sarvodaya). 
Of course, such monumental institutional change raises numerous issues and 
questions which may ultimately demand a re-thinking of our assumptions about 
political and economic development.
3 The goal of this paper is far more modest.  It will 
relate Bangladesh’s complex relationship with NGOs to what can be best described as 
“pre-theoretical” or heuristic literature that exists relevant to this issue.  Even this, of 
course, is an extremely ambitious task.  But it is an important task nonetheless.   
Bangladesh is perhaps unique in the sense that of all states in the world it is the most 
involved, perhaps most dependent, upon the operation of NGOs.  If the global trend of 
rapid proliferation of NGOs continues in the new millennium, and all relevant signs 
point in that direction, it follows that one can learn much from looking at Bangladesh’s 
experiences.  Bangladesh is truly a pathbreaker in this regard. 
The paper is divided into four sections. The first discusses the policy 
environment; the second traces issues relevant to accountability and statal interaction; 
the third addresses the topic of NGO-donor relations; and the last section frames NGOs 
in the context of globalisation. Throughout the focus of the paper will be on externally-
funded NGOs;
4 and virtually all examples utilised in the paper and attendant arguments 
will have reference to Bangladesh’s two most prominent and largest NGOs—Grameen 
Bank and BRAC.  Material for this paper was gathered over the course of the last 
decade; most was gathered during three periods of field research in Fall 1990, Summer 
1996, and Fall 1999. 
2For convenience I will use this term to refer to Bangladesh’s “big three”  NGOs (BRAC, Grameen, 
and Proshika) throughout the paper. I borrow the term “BINGOs” from Frits Wils, “Scaling Up, 
Mainstreaming, and Accountability:  The Challenge for NGOs” in Michael Edwards and David Hulme, pp. 
67–79. 
3The most important literature dealing with such developments is being published by Kumarian 
Press. 
4In Bangladesh only organisations which receive some external funding can be categorised as 
“NGOs” by the Association of Development Agencies (ADAB) the peak association representing NGO 
interests in the state.  Also, only organisations which receive external funding must be registered with the 
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I.  THE ENVIRONMENT 
By virtually any measure NGOs have found fertile soil in Bangladesh.  Using the 
somewhat restrictive criteria applied by the Dhaka-based Association of Development 
Agencies in Bangladesh (ADAB) to define NGOs (intermediary development 
organisations or private voluntary organisations with some external funding and 
registered by the NGO Affairs Bureau) there were 1370 NGOs registered (1223 local; 
147 foreign) in Bangladesh in July 1999.  (See Table 1)  Of course, these figures exclude 
the thousands of local NGOs which operate in Bangladesh without external funding.  
The number of such organisations is usually acknowledged to exceed 10,000 although 
there is no definitive listing.  Even using the ADAB criteria, however, the scope of such 
organisations is staggering.  Some are very large organisations such as BRAC or 
Grameen Bank (with thousands of employees and annual budgets that approach 100 
million dollars), but most are relatively small organisations—some of the registered 
organisations have no full-time employees at all.  The functions of such organisations, 
particularly the larger NGOs, can be extraordinarily diverse.  BRAC, perhaps the most 
diversified of all such “multitasking” NGOs, in addition to its well-known microcredit 
programmes runs among other things: poultry, livestock; fisheries; forestry; sericulture; 
vegetable; and irrigation projects. They also sponsor extensive human rights and legal 
education programmes. They also manage the largest private health care programme in 
the state (the Health and Population Programme). They are heavily involved in providing 
primary education through the Non-Formal Primary Education Programme; they have 
the largest publishing house in Bangladesh; own and manage Aarong, Bangladesh’s 
premier handicraft maker and distributor; and recently they have developed Bangladesh’s 
largest cold storage facility as well. Similarly, Grameen Bank has become synonymous 
worldwide with microcredit facilities which in effect have been franchised in Latin 
America, Africa, and North America. Grameen Check (Bangladesh’s largest Bangladesh 
labelled ready-made garment manufacturer) now exports to Europe and the US; and 
Grameen Telecom provides telecommunication capabilities to hundreds of thousands of 
rural Bangladeshis through the provision of cellular telephones. 
Given the comparatively small resource base of Bangladesh, the scope of NGO 
activities in the state is even more compelling.  The Table 1 discloses that during the 
nine year period (FY 1990–1999) over $2.4 billion (a mean of $267 million per year) 
was contributed by external sources to NGOs.  This constitutes 13-20 percent of all 
external development assistance to the state during the decade—18 percent in 1999.
5 
But, the latter figure underestimates the significance of this amount as the bulk of the 
80-odd percent of development assistance channeled through statal institutions is tied to  
5Syed M. Hashemi states that NGO foreign donor funding constituted 12 percent of total 
allocations to Bangladesh in 1992.  This figure has expanded dramatically in the last decade.  He also 
claims that between 70-84 percent of such funding went to Bangladesh’s largest fifteen NGOs.  Syed M. 
Hashemi, “NGO Accountability in Bangladesh,” in Edwards and Hulme, pp. 128–9.  Table 1 
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infrastructural and non-discretionary programmes. Moreover, external assistance 
constitutes only a fraction of the funding which is available to NGOs. Although 
comprehensive data regarding the total budgets of NGOs is not available, data for the 
Big Three BINGOs (BRAC, Grameen, and Proshika) indicates that somewhere 
between 55 to 60 percent of their funding comes from external sources.  It is almost 
certain that a smaller percentage of respective operating budgets is derived from 
external sources in the smaller NGOs. Conservatively speaking, then, Bangladesh-based 
NGOs have combined operating budgets of at least $600 million a year and perhaps as 
high as $800 million. 
One could belabour such findings.  But the bottom line is that NGOs in 
Bangladesh control extraordinary resources; their constituencies are largely external 
(the donors); and their operations are only partially dependent upon funding from the 
state. 
The significance of all of this is that the traditional relationship between the state 
and private voluntary organisations (PVOs) has been reversed in Bangladesh. The long-
standing literature on the operation of PVOs starts with the basic assumption that such 
private groups exist at the sufferance of the state and that their respective funding base 
as well as their scope of operations is limited by the state. PVOs are usually seen as 
operating in the margins where the state either has chosen not to expend resources 
and/or where the state allows the relevant operations of such private institutions to take 
place. Ultimately the state controls the shots. In Bangladesh the situation is 
fundamentally different.  NGOs command resources which are not available to the 
state; their scale of operation is at times coequal with that of the state; and their 
constituencies are independent or partially independent of the state. That is, NGOs are 
largely autonomous in Bangladesh; and at least the largest NGOs are seen as worthy 
competitors to the state for access to external donor funding. 
 
II.  ACCOUNTABILITY AND NGO-STATE INTERACTION 
Given this situation the issue of accountability of NGOs looms especially large 
in NGO-state relationships in Bangladesh.  NGO activities began in Bangladesh 
virtually consequent with the formation of the state in 1971. At first the government 
virtually ignored the operation of the NGOs—the state had much more pressing 
problems than worrying about the control of private organisations. East Pakistan had 
not had a particularly robust economy prior to the war, and its governing institutions 
had been dominated by West Pakistan. Indeed, Bangladesh inherited what could be 
called several “disabilities of Independence”; and emerged following the War as a near 
universally proclaimed  “international basket case”. Such “disabilities” attracted the 
attention of external donors, both statal and Northern NGOs, who found it increasingly 
attractive to avoid direct involvement with bureaucratic structures which seemed over-
burdened, under-staffed, and none-too-efficient. Accordingly development assistance Charles H. Kennedy  494 
was channeled increasingly to the fledgling NGOs. The three BINGOs were founded at 
this time—BRAC in 1972, Grameen in 1973 and Proshika in 1976. The founding 
documents of each of these organisations are remarkably similar.  The ambitious goal of 
each was to wholly transform rural society by reducing poverty; increasing democratic 
participation in villages; reducing the influence of local notables (moneylenders are 
particularly targeted); providing educational opportunities; and improving the condition 
of human rights.  Poverty was seen by each organisation as not just a result of income 
differentials but of the whole structure of rural society.  The language of the founding 
documents speaks of “targeting” such structures through “consciousness-raising” so that 
the marginalised population of the villages could be organised into “self-reliant” groups 
capable of wresting control of their destinies from the oppressive class structure.  That 
is, the state and its institutions were portrayed as the problem that must be overcome to 
liberate the poor. 
In hindsight one has to wonder why the Bangladesh government did not try to 
restrict the activities of the NGOs more stringently. Usually states are reluctant to 
encourage their own subversion.  But, the newly-emergent NGOs largely confined their 
activities to remote rural areas (e.g. BRAC’s almost mythical attachment to Sulla), 
eschewing the urban areas which were dominated by orthodox statal structures.   
Moreover, the new organisations were able to attract fresh sources of foreign capital; 
and hence were perceived as not competing with the state for scarce resources.  And, at 
least in the early days, the NGOs themselves were very small—BRAC, Grameen, and 
Proshika were each started on a shoestring. 
But as the NGOs prospered the points of contact and, inevitably, conflict with 
the state began to come into increasingly clear focus. First, the institution-building 
programmes of the NGOs, an integral part of their rural development strategy, came 
into increasing conflict with the local government programmes of Bangladesh.  Given 
the comprehensive nature of the village organisations established by the BINGOs, 
villagers had more contact with, and ultimately more allegiance to the respective NGO 
organisation than to organisations of the state.  It became meaningful to talk of “BRAC 
villages” or “Grameen villages”—villages dominated by their respective NGOs.   
Second, as the NGOs grew in size and prestige their operations extended into fields that 
had heretofore been reserved for the state.  NGOs began to be perceived as competitors 
with the government for foreign donor contributions. 
Things came to a head in 1992.  At that time the NGO Affairs Bureau (NAB- 
which had been established in 1990) under the control of the Prime Minister’s 
secretariat issued a “secret” though widely circulated report to the newly-elected Prime 
Minister Khaleda Zia, that charged wholesale mismanagement of NGOs.  Among other 
things the report asserted that: (1) NGOs had misused foreign and domestic funds; (2) 
that NGOs had submitted false documents to the government; (3) that NGOs were 
involved in anti-State activities; and (4) that “fifty NGOs” had secured foreign funds State, Donors, and NGOs  495 
without the permission of the government.  Throughout, the report claims, that 
executives of the NGOs enjoyed lavish lifestyles afforded by the systematic 
misappropriation of funds.
6 On August 20, 1992, the NAB issued an order cancelling 
the license to operate the Association of Development Agencies (ADAB), the peak 
association which represents the interests of the NGOs in Bangladesh. 
The issuance of this report must be seen in the context of the above discussion of 
institutional friction between the government and the NGOs.  But, its immediate cause 
seems to be linked directly to the politics of the 1992 general election.  
There is a generally accepted norm that NGOs or representatives of NGOs do 
not engage in political party activity nor stand for election.  The code of ethics of 
ADAB prohibits NGOs from engaging in such political activity.
7 Of course, as 
mentioned above, NGOs are intensely political in other senses of the term.  But, the 
actions of the NGOs which may lead to the “mobilisation of the masses” have been 
generally perceived to be acceptable to the government as such actions can also be 
interpreted positively as they provide literacy, employment, or credit to the rural poor.  
During the 1992 election, however, a prominent NGO, the Gono Shahajjo 
Shangstha (GSS), put up slates of candidates in five union elections in Nilphamari 
district.  Their goal was to unseat local notables and replace them with representatives 
of poor villagers.  During the elections which were staggered over several days one of 
the GSS candidates, reportedly a day labourer, defeated a middle class incumbent.   
Before the electoral process was complete in the other four union elections GSS 
operations were targeted—GSS schools were burned down, villagers were harassed, 
some were attacked; and GSS members were prevented from going to the polls.  The 
government sided with the establishment.  GSS activists were forced to tone down their 
rhetoric and not to directly support candidates which would upset the status quo in order 
to continue their activities.
8 
Although the case of the GSS may be the most celebrated, during the period 
following the release of the NAB report the licenses of 33 NGOs were cancelled, many 
for engaging in “anti-state” (read: radical political) activity.  The lesson to NGOs was 
clear.  The Government of Bangladesh would countenance the growth and development 
of NGOs but would counter NGOs that engaged in “radical” or “revolutionary” activity 
designed to upset the status quo. The lesson has been incorporated into the official 
doctrine of the BINGOs. Currently, one would be hard-pressed to find anything 
controversial at all in the slickly-produced descriptions of programmes or the mission 
6Personal interviews with relevant government and NGO officials Summer 1996.  The issue was 
covered extensively in the Dhaka press as well.  The most accessible description of this event is found in 
Hashemi, Ibid., pp. 124–127. 
7Personal interviews with ADAB officials, Summer 1996. 
8There is considerable disagreement about what actually took place.  Respective descriptions of 
the events seem to be related to whether one is a government official, a representative of a donor agency, 
or an NGO official.  Personal interviews, Summer 1996; September 1999.   Charles H. Kennedy  496 
statements of Bangladesh’s largest NGOs.  Gone are the references to overturning the 
class structure or for that matter upsetting the status quo at all.
9  
An uneasy truce has prevailed between the government and NGOs since the 
mid-1990s. The government views its role as attempting to hold the NGOs accountable. 
 But, there is a clear understanding that the capabilities of the government to perform 
this function are quite limited.  The staff of the NGO Affairs Bureau, the government’s 
watchdog agency has a full-time executive staff of only six officers. The officers are not 
empowered to make inspections (to go on tour); nor does the Bureau systematically 
receive reports, let alone audits of NGO activities. As of July 1999 there were 1370 
registered NGOs in Bangladesh. The main function of the Bureau is to process new 
applications for NGO status; a status conferred in turn by being successful in attracting 
foreign funding.  Applications are rarely, if ever, turned down.
10 The NGOs themselves 
recognise the limits of the government and seem far more motivated to demonstrate 
accountability to their donors or prospective donors than to the government. 
But, regardless of motivation the theoretical issues related to the accountability 
of NGOs remain largely neglected in Bangladesh. As Edwards and Hulme argue 
accountability requires the consideration of five factors: (1) a clear statement of goals 
(e.g. rules, performance criteria, etc.); (2) transparency of decision-making; (3) the 
honest reporting of resource use and achievements; (4) an appraisal process for 
reviewing authorities to judge whether results are satisfactory; and (5) concrete 
mechanisms for holding the NGOs accountable.
11 At best, NGOs in Bangladesh only 
tangentially meet these standards.  First, Bangladesh BINGOs are extremely reluctant to 
state specific goals or targets.  Their literature and reports are replete with general goals 
(e.g. alleviating poverty, empowering women, increasing the number of villages or 
clients served, etc.) but rarely do they get much more specific than that—they rarely 
offer goals that can be tested.  Second, the decision-making processes of such NGOs is 
notoriously murky.  Indeed, the organisational structures of BRAC and Grameen seem 
to be almost entirely personalistic with loyalty and authority flowing upward and 
downward from the original founders-CEOs. Third, there is widespread 
acknowledgement among NGO functionaries that reporting of achievements is tailored 
to meet the needs of the relevant reporting authority.
12 Finally, the government and the 
9The BINGOs produce an extraordinary amount of public relations material.  The editorial content of 
such material is anything but controversial. 
10Personal interview NAB, September 1999. 
11Edwards and Hulme, pp. 8–12. 
12For instance, during open discussions in the three-day “Roundtable Dialogue on NGOs” in 
Dhaka, which the author co-chaired with Mohammad Rashiduzzaman in August 1999, one prominent 
official for BRAC openly admitted that “NGOs routinely keep four sets of books—one for internal use; 
one for the government; one for the donors; and one for Board members”. Although this remark is 
anecdotal, no one in the assembly which included over 50 officials from donors, NGOs, and the 
Government of Bangladesh took issue with the statement.  Indeed, in subsequent more-private discussions 
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donors lack the mechanisms or procedures to systematically monitor the activities of the 
NGOs.  The institutional weaknesses of the NAB have already been cited; the donors 
capabilities are also quite limited. 
Moreover, these remarks do not approach the broader issue of what is often 
referred to in the literature as “strategic accountability.”  That is, the assessment of the 
impacts of the actions of NGOs on the actions of other organisations and the wider 
environment.
13 Quite simply the mechanisms and information to test whether the 
general claims of NGO success are true or false is almost non-existent. 
So, in sum the relationship between the state and NGOs and the related issue of 
accountability in Bangladesh is complex and confusing.  But, two observations seem 
warranted. First, the ideal-typical relationship between the state and NGOs (a 
relationship in which the state regulates and oversees the actions of the NGOs) needs 
considerable re-thinking with regard to Bangladesh.  In Bangladesh NGOs or at least 
the BINGOs are largely autonomous from statal institutions.  Second, the state is 
institutionally powerless and perhaps none-too-keen to challenge this situation.  This 
does not mean, however, that the relationship between the state and NGOs is not 
important as demonstrated in the earlier discussion of the 1992 general elections 
controversy.  And, it certainly does not mean that the issue of accountability and NGOs 
is not highly politicised in the state.
14   
 
III.  DONORS AND NGOs 
There is an oft-repeated, if malleable, proverb that seems impossible to escape 
when one studies NGOs in Bangladesh.  The syntax of the proverb is:  When a “donor 
agency” [insert USAID, CIDA, Care, UNICEF, NOVIB, etc.]  sneezes; the “NGO” 
[insert BRAC, Grameen, etc.] catches a cold.
15 So, for instance one version of the 
proverb could be:  “When UNICEF sneezes; BRAC catches a cold.”  This is an athletic 
proverb it can perform many functions; describe many institutional relations; and like 
all good proverbs. It conveys Truth, or at least a “paradigmatic insight.”  Namely, 
13See J. Avina, “The Evolutionary Life Cycle of Non-Governmental Development Organisations,” 
Public Administration and Development Vol. 13, No. 5 (1993), pp. 453–474. 
14For instance the Finance Minster, Shah A.M.S. Kibria, inaugurated the aforementioned roundtable 
on NGOs in Dhaka (see note 10) in August 1999.  He made rather tame comments (the type a Finance 
Minister might be expected to make to kickoff an academic conference).  However, the next day the Dhaka 
press was filled with front-page headlines signalling governmental action and threats.  The Independent ran a 
banner headline stating that “Most NGOs Engaged in Banking Operation Illegally, says Kibria”; the New 
Nation heralded that a “Curb on NGOs Likely Soon”; the Bangladesh Observer opined that “Regulatory 
Brake on NGOs Likely”; the Daily Star’s banner stated that “Kibria Lauds Role of NGOs” but the sub-
heading read: “Regulatory Brake to Ensure Accountability Likely Soon”.  Finally, the Financial Express 
stated that “BB [Bangladesh Bank] to Monitor NGO Activities”. 
15The origins of this proverb are obscure.  Another version of it is found in Ian Smillie, “Painting 
Canadian Roses Red,” in Edwards and Hulme, p. 191.  Here the proverb is: “When CIDA [Canadian 
International Development Agency] sneezes, Canadian NGOs reach for their Vitamin C”. Charles H. Kennedy  498 
BINGOs (and perhaps other NGOs too) and their respective donors are mutually 
dependent. 
Nevertheless, most of the literature on the relationship between donors (private 
or statal) and NGOs is based on an ideal model in which NGOs compete with other 
NGOs for funding from donors. The donors choose from among the applicants based 
upon the soundness of the proposal and the track-record of the applicant. After a grant 
is authorised an evaluation process is undertaken by or for the donor. On the basis of 
this evaluation the project is extended, revised or terminated. The relative performance 
of NGOs is assessed by this process; they are held accountable.  This in turn will affect 
the likelihood of future funding of respective NGOs.  That is, NGOs are at the mercy of 
the donors—they are dependent for their existence upon the donor and the donor judges 
the performance of the NGO.  Ideally, NGOs succeed or fail according to how well they 
perform their tasks. In this model merit prevails. NGOs that perform, benefit and 
prosper; those that don’t, wither and die. 
Of course, this model also implies that donors control the shots.  Or ultimately 
that donors determine or at least substantially affect the developmental agendas of 
recipient states through the NGOs. Indeed, much of the popular opposition in 
Bangladesh to the operation of NGOs is based on the perception that NGOs are 
controlled by or are dependent upon external forces; and, that the donor agenda prevails 
over domestic concerns.  
This model is partially true; it describes part of the relationship between NGOs 
and the donors. But, it neglects some very important factors. Most obviously it 
exaggerates the level of control of donors on the NGOs.  It has been argued that in 
Bangladesh the state is largely unable to fully hold accountable or even to meaningfully 
monitor the actions of the NGOs and particularly the BINGOs.  This argument is even 
more compelling when one considers the relationship between donors and NGOs on the 
ground. 
First, is the sheer enormity of the task of measuring the performance of NGOs.  
Around 600 projects which involve foreign funding are approved each year by the 
NGO Affairs Bureau in Dhaka. Many of these projects, around one-third, receive 
funding from more that one donor; some of the projects, around 10 percent, have more 
than one NGO recipient.  Many of these projects are multi-year projects.  Many involve 
activities in remote, still largely inaccessible village sites. Most of the large external 
donors sponsor numerous projects in a given year.  The projects so sponsored vary in 
myriad ways:  in size; in target; in purpose; in methodology. The larger NGOs have 
numerous relationships with donors.
16 BRAC, for instance, has received external 
support from around 50 different external donor agencies since its founding; and at any 
one time, depending on how one counts, it has between 30 and 200 ongoing projects. 
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Second, donor field staffs in Bangladesh are none-too-impressive.  Only the 
larger donor agencies have a permanent staff at all.  And, even if such staffs exist they 
are typically very small; and they tend to be filled by individuals who usually have very 
limited experience in Bangladesh.  It is rare indeed to encounter a field officer who has 
spent much time in the field. And, those that have tend to be gushingly supportive of 
NGO activities—either through idealistic personal predilections or perhaps owing to 
their “capture” by NGO interests.  There are exceptions, of course; and this typification 
may be unfair or too harsh.  But, there is no contest between the capabilities of the 
donor field staffs and the large, professional, highly-motivated, well-organised, and 
entirely impressive staffs of the larger NGOs in Bangladesh.  In the field donors are 
largely at the mercy of the NGOs. 
Third, the donors are interested in hearing good news.  It is entirely in the 
institutional interest of the donor agencies for the projects which they fund to be 
perceived to be running smoothly and to be highly successful.  The major institutional 
imperative of donor agencies is to spend their money within the budget cycle.  The 
donor community likes to talk about the “absorptive capacities” of recipient agencies.  
Good recipients are those that have high “absorptive capacities.”  This means, that good 
recipients are those that can spend the money that is granted to them within the 
specified terms of the grant (within the relevant budget cycle).  Generally speaking 
NGOs are perceived as much better at the absorption of funds than statal agencies in 
Bangladesh; and larger NGOs are perceived as even better at spending money than 
smaller NGOs.  An often heard plaint of donor field representatives in Bangladesh is 
that they would like to spread their projects around to smaller NGOs but that they tend 
to be inefficient at spending the money so distributed.  Therefore, they must 
“reluctantly” continue to provide the lion’s share of support to the BINGOs. 
The bottom-line, then, is that donors have only a murky idea of how their money 
is being spent.  In most cases, the only information they have concerning the projects 
which they fund comes from the NGOs that are running the respective projects.  Donors 
cannot rely on the Government of Bangladesh to provide such information either.  But, 
it is in the interest of donor agencies to maintain the “fiction,” if you will, that they do 
have control over the performance of their funded projects.  The donor’s constituencies 
(whether individual, private, statal, or international) need assurance that their 
contributions are being wisely spent. It is in the interest of the NGOs to maintain this 
fiction too.  It is no wonder then, that BRAC maintains the largest publishing house in 
Bangladesh. One task of this division is to maintain a steady stream of material that 
extols the virtues of BRAC programmes and highlights the contributions of donor 
agencies.  The donors need this publicity as much as BRAC.  
So, as the proverb suggests the donor needs the NGO as much as the NGO needs 
the donor; it is a symbiotic relationship like the remora and the shark, or the aphid and 
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This argument does not go so far as to suggest that NGOs are autonomous from 
the influence of donor concerns. Far from it. Rather, the argument is that the 
relationship between NGOs and donors is far more nuanced than a dependency model 
would indicate. 
This relationship is best approached by a consideration of the most deeply 
articulated construction or perhaps “ideology” of the NGO experience in Bangladesh:  
that microcredit promotes development; and that gender discrimination (favouring 
women) in the provision of such microcredit is efficient.  This ideology is well-known 
and is generally accepted globally. Indeed it has become known as the main 
contribution of Bangladesh to the development literature—sometimes termed the 
“Bangladesh model.” Grameen Bank has become synonymous with microcredit; 
Muhammad Yunus (the founder of Grameen) as having “invented” microcredit; 
Bangladesh is often cited as a success of development or at least women’s development 
as indicators of health care, fertility, infant mortality, and female literacy have improved 
and this improvement has been credited to NGO-inspired policies.  The Bangladesh 
model is also often used to support the proposition that NGOs are a more efficient 
developmental tool than statal institutions. 
Where did this ideology originate?  Apologists of the BINGOs would 
answer that it originated with their respective founders and that the idea of 
targeting microcredit to poor women emerged full-blown from the fertile 
imaginations of, depending upon one’s source, Muhammad Yunus or Fazl H. Abed 
(the founder of BRAC). There is some truth to this assertion. Both Yunus and 
Abed were intrigued in the early 1970s with the idea of providing microcredit to 
the rural poor—but it is very important to note that neither considered (despite 
recent inventive efforts of respective NGO staff writers) that microcredit be a 
major component of credit programmes to the rural poor, nor that women be the 
sole recipient of such credit programmes.  Indeed, both BRAC and Grameen 
originally established programmes that provided large scale credit as well as 
microcredit to their clients.  The movement towards reliance on microcredit was 
gradual.  Similarly neither BRAC nor Grameen originally discriminated in favour 
of women in the provision of credit.  It is true that both NGOs did recognise quite 
early on that women should not be excluded from access to credit and that 
development programmes would benefit from the extension of credit to women.  
But, until the early 1980s in the case of Grameen, and the mid 1980s in the case of 
BRAC the majority of loans made by both organisations were to men.
17 The proud 
claims made now by both organisations that over 95 percent of loans are made to 
women would have sounded a discordant note with the respective founders of 
BRAC and Grameen at least in the 1970s. 
17Derived from Table in Catherine H. Lovell, Breaking the Poverty Cycle:  The BRAC Strategy 
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The alternative proposition that the ideology originated with the donors and was 
adopted by the NGOs at first glance seems attractive.  But, even though the so-called 
“New Policy Agenda” and the four world conferences on the status of women may have 
lent support to the Bangladesh model, one is hard-pressed to find a direct link between 
the pronouncements of such forums and NGO policy.  Moreover, this author has found 
no direct evidence to link the Bangladesh ideology (Bangladesh model) to any specific 
donor source. 
Let us speculate on an explanation of the dynamics of the process that led to 
the development of this ideology.  We know the following:  Bangladeshi NGOs 
perceive themselves to be in competition for funds with other NGOs and for that 
matter with the state.  NGOs in Bangladesh (at least the BINGOs) are generally 
favourably disposed to microcredit and the targeting of women as agents of change.  
The international donor climate from the mid-1970s on has become increasingly 
disposed towards both the efficacy of microcredit and gender targeted development.  
Given the foregoing in the effort to secure funding the NGOs (BRAC and Grameen 
anyway) have tried to outbid the other for donor support.  Simply put, if microcredit 
is good, why not emphasise microcredit at the expense of other programmes?   
Alternatively, if targeting women is good why not propose giving the lion’s share of 
development aid to women? Once the process begins the logical endpoint is the 
adoption of a policy that gives priority to microcredit programmes targeted wholly to 
women. This speculation seems more compelling if one factors in the remarkable 
public relations capacities of BRAC and Grameen. 
In any case one would be hard-pressed to find any Bangladesh government 
official who would claim or even hint that microcredit works to “eliminate poverty”. 
 Most government officials actually contend that microcredit may hurt the individual 
borrowers by encouraging them to become indebted.  Most NGO officials contend 
that microcredit is largely inconsequential to the larger question of rural poverty as 
well.  The cost of microcredit in Bangladesh is quite high.  Grameen’s effective 
interest rate on its small individual loans (1999) is 28 percent; BRAC’s 25 percent.
18 
Both Grameen and BRAC assert that their relatively high interest rates are justified 
because of the labour intensive debt servicing that both organisations employ.  Of 
course, neither the BRAC nor the Grameen programme is a welfare programme; they 
are commercial lending operations and are self-supporting. 
There is more evidence for the proposition that gender targeted aid is cost-
efficient.  Several scholarly articles have been written which demonstrate that 
increased financial resources for child-bearing aged women translate into 
disproportionate increases in the well-being of their respective children—especially 
18This includes user fees, dues to respective organisations and so forth.  Discussions with relevant 
officials at “Roundtable Dialogue on NGOs” (Dhaka, August 1999). Charles H. Kennedy  502 
in terms of indicators of health and literacy.
19 But, there is little systematic evidence 
that indicates that such improved financial conditions are directly linked to women’s 
  participation in specific microcredit programmes, and none that this author has 
encountered that prove that alternative microcredit schemes (e.g. ones that would 
target only creditworthy families, or those that would be gender neutral) would not 
have the same effect on the well-being of relevant children. 
Therefore, the relationship between donors and NGOs belies an easy 
explanation.  Donors do affect the policies and programmes of NGOs and indirectly 
affect the developmental policies of recipient states.  But, they do not determine such 
policies.  Moreover, at least in Bangladesh, the NGOs are hardly powerless in this 
equation.  Indeed, the BINGOs substantially affect the policies of the donors, at times 
they may even drive such policies.  Moreover, in Bangladesh, donors have little, if any 
direct independent check on the performance of NGOs.  
 
IV.  NGOs AND GLOBALISATION 
Globalisation is a phenomenon that can best be characterised as rapidly growing 
and increasingly intensive interactions and interdependencies across statal borders.   
What Tomlinson refers to as “complex connectivity”. Increasingly, goods, capital, 
people, knowledge, fashions, drugs, ideas, crime, pollutants, tourists, development 
economists, and so forth flow across territorial boundaries.  States, even if they want to, 
are powerless to stop this flow.  The vehicles of such globalisation include the new 
technologies—satellite broadcasting, and the internet. Globalisation is multi-
dimensional.  Economic globalisation addresses the creation of a global market in 
which the interests of economic nationalists representing the state will ultimately fail to 
prevent the logic of ever-more efficient economies of scale from becoming dominant.  
Political globalisation refers to the decline of individual states as they are challenged 
from above (international and transnational organisations) and from below (non-
governmental organisations).  Cultural globalisation refers to the spreading of a global 
culture, not directly linked to the culture of any one state but increasingly reflective of 
what critics would refer to as the least-common denominator of Western civilisation.
20  
19Some of the more useful sources include:  Mohammad Auwal, “Promoting Microcapitalism in the 
Service of the Poor: The Grameen Model and its Cross-Cultural Adaptation,” Journal of Business 
Communication Vol 33 (1996), pp. 27–49; Alex Counts, Give Us Credit (New York: Time Books, 1996); 
Anne Marie Goetz and Rina Sen Gupta, “Who Takes Credit? Gender, Power, and Control over Loan Use in 
Rural Credit Programmes in Bangladesh,” World Development Vol. 24 (1996), pp. 45–63; Syed M. Hashemi 
and Sidney Ruth Schuler, “Rural Credit Programmes and Women’s Empowerment in Bangladesh,” World 
Development Vol. 24 (1996), 635–653; Sidney Ruth Schuler, Syed M Hashemi and Ann P. Ripley, “The 
Influence of Women’s Changing Roles and Status in Bangladesh’s Fertility Transition,” World Development 
Vol. 25 (1998), pp. 563–575; Muhammad Yunus, Grameen Bank as I See It (Dhaka: Grameen Bank, 1994); 
Shannon Poe-Kennedy, “Empowerment and Dis-empowerment in the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh,” 
unpublished (Cornell University, 1998); and Abu NM Wahid, ed., The Grameen Bank: Poverty Relief in 
Bangladesh (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993). 
20See John Tomlinson, Globalisation and Culture (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1999). State, Donors, and NGOs  503 
NGOs loom large in discussions of globalisation. To some they are the 
handmaidens of international donor agencies who have deliberately harnessed NGOs to 
serve their purposes by bypassing the less-efficient and much more politically difficult 
to control conventional statal institutions. According to this view the donors have 
bypassed the state in order to avoid the delays associated with working with statal 
institutions—the messiness of bureaucratic red tape, political instability, and other ills 
associated with governments.  To others NGOs are more a symptom than a cure.  They 
have developed because states have failed or are failing to provide the creativity needed 
to address global issues concerning the environment, poverty, health, and so forth.  In 
the former view the donors have conspired (deliberately or otherwise) to limit the power 
of the state; in the latter view the state has abandoned the playing field. 
Regardless of one’s interpretive framework, however, it is obvious that states 
must accommodate to the rapid changes associated with globalisation.  And, in more 
instances than not states are losing authority to NGOs, which in turn are increasingly 
seen as the darlings of the international donor community, if not the agents of Western 
economic, political and cultural imperialism. 
It is in this context that one needs to view the so-called  Islamic reaction to 
NGOs that became quite violent during the mid-1990s in Bangladesh and which still 
reverberates today.  In late 1993, a movement began in Bogra district, led by a local pir 
which called for the boycott of NGOs supported by Christian groups. Of course, 
functionally this meant all NGOs in the state, as NGOs in Bangladesh are defined by 
the NAB, as we have seen, as those organisations which receive foreign funding and in 
turn virtually all foreign funding to NGOs comes from “Christian states”.  The 
movement had particular relevance to BRAC and Grameen both of which had extensive 
projects in the district. The “Bengal Anti-Christian Organisation,” as this movement 
became known, leveled numerous charges against the NGOs including: 
  1.  NGOs were destroying the Islamic cultural values of the   state; 
  2. NGO operations were reminiscent of the East India Company operations, i.e. 
among other things colonial; 
  3.  BRAC schools were anti-religious; 
  4.  Members of NGOs were engaged in extra-marital sex; 
  5. The microcredit programmes of Grameen and BRAC were destroying the 
family structure of rural society; 
  6. NGOs were really fronts for Christian missionaries, hellbent to convert 
Muslims; and that  
  7.  BRAC’s and Grameen’s microcredit programmes violated the ban on riba.
21 
21Adapted from M. Rashiduzzaman, “The Dichotomy of Islam and Development:  NGOs, 
Women’s Development and Fatawa in Bangladesh,” Contemporary South Asia Vol 6, No. 3 (1997), p. 
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The remedy for such ills was to drive the NGOs out of the state.  This they tried 
to do. Accordingly, BRAC schools were targeted, and depending upon the source 
anywhere from a “handful” to “over fifty” schools were attacked, teaching materials 
were destroyed or confiscated and in some cases schools were actually burned.  Some 
NGO workers were roughed up.  BRAC and Grameen enterprises were targeted as 
well—reportedly mulberry trees (linked to BRAC’s sericulture projects) were uprooted; 
and there were charges of attacks upon BRAC supported restaurants, and poultry 
raising concerns.
22 
The state’s role in all of this was somewhat ambivalent.  NGOs charged that 
governmental functionaries acted in a half-hearted manner to quell the riots.  They also 
charged that some local government officials actually supported the Islamic groups.  
Such charges were likely true.  As discussed above NGO-state relations have many 
points of strain, and there remained lingering animosity associated with the events that 
had transpired in 1992. 
There is also ample evidence to support the assertion that BRAC and Grameen 
“played” this issue to full effect with the international donor community.  The BINGOs 
typified the Bengal Anti-Christian Organisation’s actions as reactionary and entirely 
unjustified.  They also exaggerated their scope.  More importantly, they identified their 
concerns with those of the donor community.  How better to prove one’s worthiness for 
funding than to contrast one’s projects with the “irrational” concerns of the Islamists.  
The attacks (particularly if they were perceived as widespread) demonstrated to donors 
that: (a) the NGO projects were working; (b) that they had affected meaningful change 
in the direction of their goals; and (c) reiterated the posture that the BINGOs were 
accomplishing tasks associated with modernisation and globalisation.  After all, if the 
Islamic groups’ claims were true then the NGOs had been effective in spreading global 
culture. 
It also attracted donor funding to the NGOs.  Donor contributions to NGOs rose 
by 39 percent in FY 1995 from $315 million to $440 million. [See Table 1.] The 
BINGOs were the largest beneficiaries of this increase. 
It seems likely to this observer that NGOs will continue to be central to the 
globalisation process.  Evidence for this view comes from a remarkable document 
published in 1998 by the World Bank—Assessing Aid:  What Works, What Doesn’t and 
Why?
23  This thin volume summarises the working papers of the World Bank’s 
Development Research Group, especially the work of David Dollar and Paul Collier.  It 
signals an important departure in World Bank policy which will have a significant 
impact on the perceived importance of NGOs. 
22There is considerable disagreement over the extent of this incident.  BINGO officials claim the 
damage was extensive; government officials claims far less damage.  Personal interviews 1996; 1999. 
23World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why? (New York:  Oxford 
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The report can be boiled down to five main policy implications or conclusions: 
  1. Aid should be targeted at low-income countries which possess sound economic 
management.  In a sound institutional   environment aid works; in a bad 
environment aid doesn’t. 
  2. Conditionality programmes don’t work.  Conditionality only works when the 
state has sound economic management. 
  3. All aid is fungible; therefore project funding to states should be abandoned or 
reduced.  Aid should be channeled to  institutions that can manage aid. They are 
better able to assess needs and requirements than external donors. 
  4. Aid should attempt to increase public service delivery and to promote 
institutional capacities. 
  5. In states with “distorted” governmental institutions donors need to locate 
“pockets of reform” and support them vigorously. 
The document is a virtual ode to globalisation.  States wherein sound economic 
management resides (those that should get the bulk of aid) are states that toe the line 
with respect to the global agenda.  Such states would have, we are told, sound 
macroeconomic policy; liberal trade policies; a well-established rule of law; enforced 
property rights; political stability; good civil servants; a low level of corruption and so 
forth. 
Of course, this report would be quick to dismiss Bangladesh, from consideration 
for state-centred economic aid.  Bangladesh clearly possesses “distorted governmental 
institutions” [not this author’s terminology].  In such situations the only reasonable 
recourse for international donors is to target “pockets of reform”.  The implication of all 
of this is that aid should be increasingly channeled through NGOs, not statal 
institutions.  The importance of this document has not been lost on NGOs in 
Bangladesh, nor the government for that matter. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It is often argued that NGOs play an important role in Bangladesh in that they 
provide critical services that the government is unwilling or unable to provide and 
therefore that without NGO activities needed programmes and services would not be 
provided to Bangladeshi citizens particularly in rural areas.  Therefore, the 
interaction between NGOs and the government can be viewed in positive-sum terms, 
everybody benefits. 
Of course, this is partially true.  But, this paper has demonstrated that such an 
analysis neglects or downplays the costs of NGOs.  The greatest such cost is borne 
by the decline in the authority of the state when compared with the burgeoning 
authority of NGOs.  Every notable success of an NGO reinforces the view that:  (a) 
NGOs are competent while governmental institutions are not; (b) that NGOs should Charles H. Kennedy  506 
be accorded even greater authority in the state; and (c) that NGOs deserve a larger 
share of the donor pie.  In other words, the perceived successes of NGOs challenges 
the integrity of statal institutions. 
Such a development may be welcome if it is assumed that NGOs will be better at 
running the affairs of the state than the existing governmental institutions.  But, the 
logical endpoint of this consideration is untenable—the total erosion of the state.   
Moreover, the very success of NGOs is predicated to a large degree on their not being 
permanent institutions.  The strength of NGOs is derived from the fact that they are not 
governmental institutions. And, there is always the issue of donor dependency, or in 
NGOspeak “limitations imposed by multiple stakeholder involvement”.  Ultimately, 
NGOs are dependent upon their funding base—they must attend to their constituency.  
To the extent that NGOs become increasingly powerful or important to the political 
process of Bangladesh, the role of the donor community proportionally increases. 
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To begin with, I must say that the paper by Charles Kennedy is thought 
provoking, incisive and well-documented on a theme which is relatively virgin. My 
next comment relates to Lester Salamon’s statement quoted in Kennedy’s paper that 
the NGO movement “may constitute as significant a social and political development 
of the latter twentieth century as the rise of the nation-state was of the nineteenth 
century” that I consider to be premature because whereas the emergence of the 
nation-state, starting from the Treaty of Westphalia, has a whole history of three and 
half centuries, the NGO movement is barely two decades old. 
My principal criticism on Professor Kennedy’s paper is as follows. It raises at 
least seventeen questions relating to the topic of “NGOs and the state” such as these: 
How do NGOs interact with states? Are they a challenge to the State? Are they 
complementary to the state? Are they a symptom of the decline of the state? 
However, he fails to properly address them both through the case study and 
otherwise, though in the case study here and there one finds a feeble attempt to 
provide elements of response to some of the questions. Normally a case study is 
attempted to illustrate a certain viewpoint which, strangely enough, is not the case 
here. 
The international economic orthodoxy promoted by World Bank and IMF and 
implementation of structural adjustment has led to increasing withdrawal of the state 
from the economic sphere and a de-emphasis of the state-led development strategies 
with the World Bank view being that the state should restrict itself to providing a 
“sound macro-economic and legal framework” for investment. The reduction in state 
activity in terms of health, education, agriculture extension, etc., has led to a large 
increase in NGOs resources to fill the “service delivery gap”. Many academics and 
development practitioners believe that NGOs are essential building blocks in a “civil 
society” against a “predatory” and “rent-seeking” state. Some argue that NGOs could 
be the training ground for an “articulate and empowered middle class” essential for 
stable and lasting democratic politics. 
The next important question is whether NGOs are a challenge to the state or 
are complementary to it. Unlike the private voluntary organisations of the past which 
worked under state control, the present day NGOs tend to act independently of the 
state. This is so because of the resources which are at their disposal and which at 
times rival or even surpass those of the state. Many of them also select areas of 
operation which is not much visible such as rural constituencies. The result is that 
though they prefer to operate in areas where the state is absent because of lack of Ijaz Hussain  508
resources or will or interest or even consciousness, but as they start making headway 
and develop a constituency of their own they come to be perceived as competitor and 
consequently a threat to the state. 
State has traditionally been a protector of the status quo in the wider sense of 
the term, i.e. religious, political, economic and social. It has been the backer of the 
vested interests. The NGOs basically propose to break the status quo, directly or 
indirectly, consciously or otherwise. This necessarily tends to put the two in 
antagonistic relationship. Even a state with a modernist agenda tends to side with 
partisans of status quo as it perceives threat from apparently like-minded NGOs. 
Some NGOs, particularly foreign funded ones, promote values of societies of 
which they are products, particularly in the field of human rights, such as child 
labour, minority rights, gender question, etc. They are understandably perceived as 
“Trojan horses” of the West. This may or may not be true but following the birth of 
the so-called right of intervention on humanitarian grounds since early 1990s, the 
West has the potential to penetrate in Third World societies through the NGOs, 
particularly those with human rights agenda. 
Finally the question as to whether NGOs are a symptom of the decline of the 
state, in our judgement, we do not think so despite the fact that the state is under 
attack from various sources, particularly from the outside through IFIs and from the 
inside through NGOs. What we foresee through NGOs is the transformation of the 
state rather than its decline as it is likely to appropriate in the future the NGO agenda 








One welcomes Charles Kennedy into the discussion on the NGO 
phenomenon, as an unexpected, though very welcome critic. Unlike many other 
academics in the West and in our own countries, Kennedy distances himself from 
what has  become conventional wisdom, and takes a very critical look at NGOs in 
general, focussing his discussion on NGOs in Bangladesh. His focus on Bangladesh 
is important as this country has become the worst (or best, depending on one’s point 
of view) example of the presence and role of this third sector. 
Kennedy argues that Bangladesh is perhaps the one country most dependent 
on NGOs receiving between $6–800 million each year from foreign (namely 
western) donors. Clearly, as he argues, NGOs in Bangladesh control ‘extraordinary 
resources’, and because of foreign funding, ‘NGOs are largely autonomous of the 
state’ and ‘demonstrate accountability to their donors, not to the state’. Kennedy 
argues that NGOs do not state specific goals or targets, that their decision-making 
process is ‘murky’ and personalistic; donors, on the other hand, are interested in 
hearing good news and the larger the NGO the more money it gets, with the larger 
NGOs in Bangladesh, in a sense, determining donor funding rather than the other 
way round. 
One cannot but agree with Charles Kennedy about his analysis of the NGO 
scene in Bangladesh. What is very unfortunate, however, is that his paper while 
making these points, lacks much academic rigour, weakening the case that he pleads. 
Given the excessive bombardment of pro-NGO published material, one feels rather 
disappointed, that this piece by Charles Kennedy will quickly be forgotten because it 
is such a weak paper. 
The title of the paper seems somewhat odd, for despite my searching, I could 
not find any substantive discussion on the state. There are a few references to the 
Latin American experience, some mention of other countries, but one must ask: 
where is the state in this analysis? 
He talks about a conflict between NGOs and the state, but this argument does 
not really come through, except in terms of access to funds. In this assertion, which 
is neither documented or quantified, the underlying assumption is that the huge 
amounts of money which come to NGOs in Bangladesh and elsewhere, were taken 
away from the state. Since there is no data on the trends in aid to the Bangladeshi 
government or its NGOs, one does not know whether there is a trade-off between 
government and NGOs in terms of a competition for foreign aid. This is one of the 
important points which have been overlooked. 
One does not know from reading this paper whether the large amounts of 
money coming to NGOs distorts the development process in the country. There is no 
analysis of the net impact of aid to NGOs, merely assertions. One does also not learn S. Akbar Zaidi  510
from this paper what the donor agenda is: why are most western governments so 
interested in pouring in such large amounts of money to Bangladesh’s NGOs? 
Moreover, what indeed, is the impact of such large amounts of money on NGOs? 
Are they corrupted and compromised in some way? Unfortunately, we do not find 
out from this paper. 
If, as Charles Kennedy argues, the state has institutions which are ‘distorted’, 
and if NGOs are ‘challenging the integrity of statal institutions’, then is that not a 
positive development? If we have a predatory state or fascist state as we did in Latin 
America not long ago, is it not a positive sign that NGOs begin to threaten that 
authority? Because Kennedy does not have a theory of the state, these important 
questions are neither articulated and raised, nor addressed. Similarly, he argues that 
due to the powerful role of NGOs in Bangladesh, the greatest cost is borne by the 
decline in the authority of the state when compared with the burgeoning authority of 
NGOs. This important point, too, is not elaborated upon, and the nature of the 
‘authority’ of either the state or NGOs, is never made explicit. 
This paper has lacked thoroughness and rigour and has been based on what 
the author calls a methodology that is ‘informally empirical’, backed more by 
assertion and supposition than anything else. For this reason, this is a lost 
opportunity for all those who are critical of NGOs, as this paper has not provided 
substantive arguments on which to build upon. 
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